Introduction
The purpose of this article is to set out an Aristotelian account of individual autonomy. Individual autonomy is the capacity of the individual to make and act upon judgments for which he is held morally accountable. This sense of autonomy may be contrasted to a number of other senses. Of these, the most important are political or legal autonomy and Kantian principled autonomy. Political or legal autonomy concerns the environment in which an individual operates. It exists where individuals are able to operate reasonably freely. 1 For the most part we will not consider this sense except insofar as it is necessary to explain the importance placed on respecting individual autonomy. Kantian principled autonomy has been described recently by Onora O"Neill in a series of writings. 2 On this account, autonomy is seen as a characteristic of the principle behind action rather than of action per se and is not a characteristic of agents at all.
O"Neill developed her Kantian account of autonomy in response to difficulties she perceives in the individual view of autonomy, the view that it is an attribute of most adults and their actions. She says its central difficulty lies in reconciling a naturalist view of action, in which human action is seen as due to natural states of beliefs and desires, with the view that such action nonetheless is morally of great or supreme value. In order to attribute autonomy to most adults and their actions, someone holding to an individual view of autonomy will need to define autonomy in terms of criteria that are generally shared. These are usually naturalist. For example, autonomous actions will be defined as those that are unfettered and arise from an agent's desires. O"Neill holds that excessive weight is placed upon such minimal and implausible conceptions of individual autonomy. This difficulty is seen in situations where the principle of respect for autonomy is thought to bear as much upon bad, poorly thought through and habitual decisions as it does upon good and fully rational decisions. It is difficult to see how autonomy can be morally special once it has been defined in terms of natural features that are widely shared. How could actions arising from the unfettered desires of someone who is acting immorally or amorally be thought to be of moral importance?
The
Aristotelian account we will consider here is not vulnerable to this criticism largely because it is naturalist through and through. Someone who holds to the account would not accept O'Neill's implicit assumption that moral considerations are separate from prudential considerations.
Autonomy: beliefs and puzzles
Aristotle's method has been extensively discussed. In the discussion of an ethical concept or issue, Aristotle draws upon the different, credible views and beliefs about it. Views are credible if they are held either by many people or by the wise. 3 Aristotle also requires that we attend to relevant puzzles. Indeed, inquiry will be stimulated by their presence. The puzzles may arise because credible views conflict with each other or because they do not give a complete explanation.
A satisfactory account of an ethical concept or issue will enable us to explain the different views and beliefs and resolve the puzzles. It will enable us to show which beliefs are true and which are false. It will also enable us to show why beliefs that are false appeared to be true. Where there are puzzles of incomplete knowledge it will enable us to offer new, correct, beliefs. This is a somewhat over-linear description of Aristotle's method. The process is far more fluid than this, with new puzzles emerging alongside new beliefs.
There seem to be a number of sources for the views of most people and of wise people on the concept of autonomy. The views of wise people are reasonably easy to elicit either from direct discussion of the topic or from discussions of related topics. The views of most people may be elicited in at least two ways. The first is through their explicit views on related topics. For example, empirical research on the opinions of patients of the value of informed consent suggests that people do value their autonomy over matters of health. 4 The second source is through thought experiments.
For example, it is common to suggest that the intuitive abhorrence felt by most people toward the social order described in Aldous Huxley"s Brave New World, in which people are rendered content but non-autonomous by drugs, is suggestive of the intrinsic value placed on autonomy. 5 From such sources it is possible to set out the beliefs and puzzles. In both cases they can be divided into those to do with the nature of autonomy, and those to do with its value.
Beginning, then, with the nature of autonomy, the term "autonomy"
suggests self-rule and sovereignty over action. This means more than being unconstrained, or at liberty. Thus autonomy involves more than just being free. 6 A young child, a psychotic adult, and an animal may all be unconstrained without being autonomous. Typically, it is rational agents who are said to be autonomous. 7 However, rational agents are not autonomous where they act upon desires implanted in them involuntarily through, for example, hypnosis or brainwashing. Such desires have been termed "alien desires." 8 However, the majority of adult human beings are autonomous and, most of the time, act autonomously. 9 Autonomy has two dimensions. 10 One final set of beliefs concerns the connection of autonomy with moral responsibility. 12 It seems probable that it is a necessary condition for holding someone morally responsible for an action that he be an autonomous agent. Where an autonomous agent acts autonomously it is probable also that this will be a sufficient condition for holding him morally responsible. There is a grey zone of negligent actions for which agents are held responsible but which do not seem autonomous.
It seems that autonomy is held to be of value in two ways. In the first place, it is important that autonomy develops in human agents. Inasmuch as autonomy is linked to rationality, the development of the two qualities seems intertwined. When autonomy does not develop or when it is lost, due to illness, accident or disability, it is seen as a tragedy. It is also important that autonomy is respected. It is seen as outrageous if autonomous agents are not permitted to make both important and trivial decisions about their lives. This is so even if an individual makes bad decisions. 13 The puzzles concerning autonomy can be similarly divided into puzzles to do with the nature of autonomy and puzzles to do with the value of autonomy. On the nature of autonomy, an account of autonomy needs to indicate criteria of autonomous agency and action. For example, it should allow us to determine whether we take the self-destructive action of a spurned young person to be autonomous. 14 The account should also allow us to determine how autonomy is related to moral responsibility.
Generally we would hold that autonomy of agency and action is necessary in order to hold someone morally responsible for what she does. However, the relationship is not straightforward. We sometimes hold people morally responsible for acts that do not seem autonomous, as when a driver unknowingly breaks a local by-law.
On the value of autonomy, the key problem is that while it is widely accepted that the development and exercise of autonomy is of great value, it
is not the only thing of value. There will be occasions when, in particular, what is good for them and their species. 17 Therefore, in pursuing pleasures animals also pursue their good, but they do not do this consciously. As such, although they act voluntarily, they cannot but desire and, therefore, act as they do. By contrast, human beings pursue their good consciously.
They have rational desire. A rational desire is a desire for something as good, worthwhile or of value. An individual"s complete set of rational desires will constitute his view of goodness. However, he does not act upon these non-rational desires. A weak-willed agent has the same structure of desires as a self-controlled agent.
However, she does act upon her non-rational desires. Finally, a vicious agent has the wrong view of goodness. He has the wrong rational desires and acts upon them. Aristotle believes most people to be somewhere between self-controlled and weak-willed. 19 When an agent with moral character acts voluntarily, he expresses his character and can be held morally responsible for what he does. For this reason, we can say that the quality in virtue of which someone is autonomous is the quality in virtue of which he possesses moral character.
Hence, an autonomous agent must possess moral character and someone who possesses moral character must be an autonomous agent.
Two concerns arise in relation to this Aristotelian account of autonomy. One concern relates to action that originates in the non-rational desires of some autonomous agents, in particular, weak-willed agents. As we do not hold animals and young children morally responsible for actions that have their origin in non-rational desire, it would seem that this should be so also for similar actions by autonomous agents. However, this is out of line with common beliefs about weakness of will and with Aristotle's explicit doctrine on the subject. In response, an Aristotelian could say that a virtuous agent shows us that it is possible for all autonomous agents to gain rational control over their non-rational desires. Similarly, the self- Essentially, a negligent act results from a failure to pay proper attention.
Such a failure is a product of moral character. It is acting through ignorance rather than in it.
The value of autonomy
A satisfactory account of autonomy must allow us to say why autonomy matters and why we should respect autonomy. It should also allow us to say how much it matters and indicate how we should respond when autonomy clashes with other values. From an Aristotelian perspective it is necessary to return to basic issues, in particular, the way in which an
Aristotelian virtue ethics differs from other approaches such as Kantianism.
Aristotelian virtue ethics has gradually re-entered the mainstream, partly through the work of G.E.M. Anscombe. One of Anscombe"s points is that the modern sense of "right" as in "morally right" does not occur in Aristotle. 21 Aristotle does not have a notion of "moral" considerations or reasons to act distinct from other areas. Aristotelian ethics is naturalistic.
Anscombe invokes Aristotle in opposing the notion that there is a naturalist fallacy in ethics. For Aristotle, the reasons we have to act in whatever way, for example, to be just to someone, to drink a glass of wine or to get married, all depend ultimately on the kind of creature we are. Both Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre have developed explicitly naturalist accounts of virtue and ethics that draw upon Aristotle's naturalism and upon his essentialist biology. 22 We must bear in mind this background of naturalism and essentialism when developing an Aristotelian account of the value of autonomy. Onora O"Neill"s view is that the concept of individual autonomy is unable to bear the moral weight brought to it. For example, we cannot employ it to show why poorly thought through decisions are as morally valuable as fully rational decisions. An Aristotelian account does not need to allow us to do this as it does not provide us with a conception of goods having moral weight over and above their value to us qua rational, social animals.
Aristotle draws a connection between the terms "good" and "function" when developing his understanding of the good life for human beings. 23 Someone who learns habitually to tell the truth but without the right intention will not develop virtue. In addition, there is no single action, or set of actions, whose repetition could possibly habituate a person to virtue.
Virtue is manifested in many ways. A virtuous agent will act rightly in completely novel situations. What will be common to all his actions will be that they are done because they are morally right, reflecting the agent"s right intention and view of goodness. It follows that in order to become virtuous a person must be habituated to choosing to do things because they are morally right. Moral rightness must become part of one"s intention.
Autonomy is central to this process. An agent who is forced to go through the motions of virtuous action will never develop virtue. Similarly, an agent who is implanted with alien desire in order to act as a virtuous agent does will simply be left with a pocket of desire that is untouched by the agent"s own ratiocination and which will have no effect on the rest of his view of goodness. An agent must exercise autonomy in order to become virtuous.
Overall, this gives us three ways in which autonomy is a necessary component of happiness. The first is that in order to be happy an agent must be an autonomous agent, that is, one with moral character. The second is that a virtuous autonomous agent must, for the most part, act autonomously in order to be happy. The third is that autonomy is central to developing the virtuous moral character that enables one to be happy.
However, it is possible, indeed common, for autonomous agents to fail to be virtuous. Therefore, autonomy is a necessary, but not sufficient component of happiness. that such people must be permitted to act autonomously if they are to develop their character. However, the way in which respect for autonomy is manifest in such cases will be different from the way it is manifest with virtue. Both self-controlled and weak-willed agents are, in a sense, wavering. A self-controlled person is in danger of giving in to non-rational desire. A weak-willed person might be persuaded to follow his rational desire. In such circumstances, we should seek to support the rational desire of the person. More colloquially, we should try to get the person to see reason. For example, we might try to dissuade someone struggling to control his alcohol intake from meeting at a bar.
The contribution to happiness of acts reflecting vice is the least direct of the four main character types. Nonetheless, vicious agents are likely to be discontent in various ways. Essentially, a vicious agent rationally endorses his non-rational desires, making them his rational desires. There is no reason to expect the non-rational desires to form a unified view of goodness. A vicious agent may have an appetite to eat to excess, be excessively promiscuous, and drink too much. He may also want to do this over a full life. All such desires may lead him in different directions, and the satisfaction of one of them may sabotage the satisfaction of another.
For example, the obesity and illness caused by intemperate eating and drinking may sabotage his plans to live long. Thus, even a vicious agent may come to reflect on his life and change. Again, therefore, the main role of others would seem to be to respect the autonomy of a vicious agent but also to try to get the person to see reason. Thus there is always a strong prima facie case for respecting autonomy. However, the nature of the respect will vary depending upon the character type manifested by the particular autonomous action.
Autonomy is not only of instrumental value in happiness. For
Aristotle, happiness is largely comprised of on an active life of virtue for which autonomy is necessary. To that extent it is intrinsically valuable.
Indeed, autonomous action is of instrumental value even where an action is not good or right action. However, this is not to side with liberals for whom autonomy is of supreme value such that paternalism is always objectionable. On an Aristotelian account, it is sometimes permissible to stop people when they are making bad judgments. Some choices may be so destructive that they remove the autonomy of an individual and hence the ability to develop his moral character. 25 
